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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 15/05/2006

Accident number: 216

Accident time: 09:10

Accident Date: 23/04/1998

Where it occurred: Near Ljuninye,
Republika Srpska

Country: Bosnia Herzegovina

Primary cause: Inadequate training (?)
Class: Detection accident

Secondary cause: Unavoidable (?)
Date of main report: 27/10/1998

ID original source: WEL/CS/BiH MAC

Name of source: BiH MAC

Organisation: Name removed
Mine/device: PROM-1 AP Bfrag

Ground condition: agricultural
(abandoned)
electromagnetic
rocks/stones

Date record created: 16/02/2004

Date last modified: 16/02/2004

No of victims: 3

No of documents: 2

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: GR: YH42068

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale: Capljina

Map series: M709

Map edition: WGS 84

Map sheet: 2681 11

Map name:

Accident Notes
dog missed mine (?)
safety distances ignored (?)
inadequate training (?)
inadequate communications (?)

Accident report
The following is the full BiH MAC Accident report, edited for anonymity. The demining was
being done by a joint commercial demining company – the lead partner being an ex-pat
organisation.
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INTRODUCTION
1.

A mine accident occurred on 23 April 1998 at a demining task site, approximately at
Grid Reference YH420684 near Ljubinje, in the Republika Srpska. This accident
involved members of Company Y; One man was killed, two other deminers were injured
and a mine-detecting dog was killed. The company reported the accident to HQ MAC
on 23 April 1998.

2.

On the day of the accident HQ MAC appointed [Investigator No.1] as Chairman of a
Board of Inquiry to conduct an investigation and report about the accident. [Investigator
No.2], EOD coordinator at HQ MAC was appointed as a member of the Board.

3.

HQ MAC issued Terms of Reference for the Board of Inquiry. These are shown at
Annex A to this report.

CONDUCT OF THE INVESTIGATION
4. The Board of Inquiry deployed to Company Y regional HQ at the Ljubinje hotel, from
Sarajevo on the day of the accident and arrived at the hotel at approximately 1830hrs.
[The Demining group]’s Operations Officer, [Investigator No.3] accompanied the Board
of Inquiry team throughout the investigation and directed assistance to the team where
required.
5.

Shortly after arrival at the hotel, written statements were requested from all members of
the team involved. Statements were provided the next day, these are shown at Annex
B.

6.

Members of the Board made a break in the journey from Sarajevo to [the Demining
group]’s regional headquarters at approximately 1700hrs, in order to inspect the scene
of the accident. At this time an assessment was made of the site layout and conduct of
[the Demining group]’s operations. The site was re-visited the next day

7.

Investigation lasted one day; this included interviews, writing of statements, visits to the
site of the accident, inspection of documents & maps and of clothing and equipment
used by the team.

8.

The injured deminer still under treatment was interviewed in Trebinje hospital on 23
April 1998. All other personnel were interviewed either on the day of the accident or the
day after.

GENERAL
9. Personnel from [the Demining group] had been working at this task site for three days.
This task was part of a large mined area that [the Demining group] have been working
on for some weeks. RS PIU tasked the company to work in this area. HQ MAC holds
minefield records and information for the site and surrounding areas and the team
working in this area were in possession of this information as part of an HQ MAC target
folder.
10. The team working the task was Survey Team S2. This team was structured in
accordance with [the Demining group] regional structure and consisted of a local team
leader, six deminers, a medic, two dogs and handlers and a driver. A PIU/World Bank
monitor was also on the site.
11. [The Demining group]’s Survey Teams’ Manager is responsible for three separate
survey teams and visits the hotel and associated work-sites twice or three times each
week, as part of his normal works schedule.
12. Mine involved in this accident was a PROM-1 bounding Anti Personnel fragmentation
mine.
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GEOGRAPHY
13. The area that [the Demining group] is operating in is inside the Zone of Separation,
approximately 6 kilometres south of the town of Stolac.
14. The task site area is approximately three kilometres from the nearest surfaced road.
The area is very rough ground, rocky and difficult to travel or walk over. Vegetation is
sparse. No local residents were observed anywhere near to this site. Priority for the
task was determined by the RS PIU.
15. [The Demining group] personnel live in and deploy from [the Demining group]’s local
Headquarters at the Ljubinje hotel, Grid Reference BN623597. All local employees live
at the hotel.
16. Task site from [the Demining group]’s location at the Ljubinje hotel is approximately 15
Kilometres, travelling time is approximately twenty minutes.

SITE LAYOUT
17. The area of the task site, including the Control Point is marked and taped-off. Marking
on the site and in the clearance lanes is adequate. Control Point is in a cleared area of
rough ground, approximately 350 metres from the scene of the accident.
18. The area where the accident occurred is within the triangular-shaped area of ground at
the corner of two dry-stone walls. The area between the point of detonation and the
base line is divided into 10 metre by 10 metre “boxes” that had been cleared prior to the
accident. The area where the accident occurred is within the final 10 metre by 10 metre
“box” to be cleared before the walls are reached
19. When the accident occurred, Team leader and one other deminer were working at
approximately 30 metres distance from the explosion, in areas that had been previously
cleared.

SUPERVISION AND QUALITY ASSURANCE
20. Supervision of survey teams in this [Demining group] region is provided, in the first
instance, by team leaders, in this case the team leader was a local national. The next
line of supervision is provided by visits to the sites by the [Demining group] Operations
Officer. At the time of the accident the Operations Officer was in Pale. Team Manager
visits approximately every two days. A Quality Assurance Officer also inspects the team
and the site approximately once each week. [The Team Manager and QA officer] were
in the local area but not on site when the accident occurred.
21. An RS PIU monitor is on the site at all times. [He] states that clearance operations on
the site at that time were normal and no safety points were at issue.

COMMUNICATIONS
22. [The Demining group] communications to anywhere outside the region is generally by
HF radio. This set-up allows HF communications to [Demining group] HQ in Pale and
elsewhere. Communications have been improved since [the lead Demining group]’s
earlier accidents.
23. Communications between the site and Pale are reported as usually good. On the day of
the accident, communications between the task site and Pale were poor, probably due
to atmospheric conditions.
24. Communications between the team on the site are by means of hand-held VHF radios.
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25. Operations are commanded and controlled from a field level. Co-ordination is from [the
lead Demining group]’s HQ Pale and through the Field Operations Manager.

MEDICAL
26. A comprehensive medical kit was on site at the time of the accident. Medic was
stationed at the Control Point, approximately 350 metres from the scene of the
accident. Ambulance was on the site.
24. The nearest hospital to the accident site is at Stolac, approximately 10 Kilometres,
travelling time is approximately 15 minutes. [The Demining group] state that this hospital
has been evaluated and was assessed as not being capable of dealing with traumatic
injuries caused by mine accidents.
25. The injured deminer was taken to the hospital at Trebinje, approximately 73 kilometres;
travelling time is approximately 70 minutes.
26. The explosion occurred at 0910hrs. Ambulance arrived at Trebinje hospital at 1045hrs.
Injured Dog Handler [Victim No.1] died at the hospital ten minutes after arrival. The
hospital was ready for casualties to arrive because the Team Manager travelled ahead
of the casualties in order to ensure that preparations were being made for the arrival of
the ambulance.
27. The injured deminers. Inspection of the deceased’s flak jacket showed nine perforations
caused by entry of fragments from the mine. A significant area of the flak jacket was
blasted away, at the base of one side of the jacket.
28. Team Leader [Victim No.2] was slightly injured only and was released from hospital on
the day of the accident.
29. Deminer [Victim No.3] sustained shrapnel injuries to the back of his right knee. It is
anticipated that he will be released from hospital by 28 April 1998.
30. The mine detecting dog, [name excised] was also killed in the blast from the mine.
31. All [Demining group] personnel at this site are familiar with CASEVAC procedures and
the route to Trebinje hospital.
32. Survey Team S3 were working near this general area and arrived to assist with the
CASEVAC after hearing the explosion.
PERSONALITIES
33. Survey Team S2 and personnel directly involved are as follows.
Team Manager, Survey Teams S1, S2 & S3
Team leader Survey Team S2
Deminer
Deminer
Deminer
Deminer
Deminer
Deminer – Injured in blast from mine.
Dog Handler
Dog Handler – Killed in blast from mine.
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Team Medic
Driver
PIU Monitor at the site.

DOGS
34. Dogs involved at this site were as follows
[Dog A] - Handler was Killed in blast from mine.
[Dog B] - Handler was [name excised].
35. No problems were reported with either of the dogs on the day of the accident or on
recent days prior to the accident. Both dogs were fully trained and experienced. Both
came from the USDCC/RONCO demining programme in BiH 1996/1997.
36. [The lead Demining group]’s dogs receive continuation training on a regular basis and
are formally retrained and evaluated monthly. [The dead dog] was evaluated within the
last month as part of the routine programme of continuation training.
37. The dead dog was found with its leash close to but unattached to its collar. It may be
possible that the leash may have been removed during the blast from the explosion. It is
normal practice for [the Demining group]’s dogs to be deployed either on a leash or freerunning, depending on the nature of the ground and the Dog Handler’s evaluation of the
work required.

EQUIPMENT
38. The Board carried out an informal test on a metal detector used at the site. It was found
that the detector could be used only with difficulty due to the high mineral or metal
content of the rock that forms most of the ground in this area.
39. Hand tools used by the demining team were standard prodders, trowels and garden
pruning shears. These were used in the normal manner, approved by MAC Technical
and Safety Guidelines.

DRESS
40. Protective clothing and headgear is available for all vulnerable personnel in [the
Demining group]’s demining operations. Industrial working boots are issued to all
demining personnel.
41. All protective clothing provided by [the Demining group]’s to demining teams is designed
to provide a minimum protection to the wearer against 1.1g fragments travelling at a
velocity of 450 metres per second.
42. Every deminer in every team is issued with a helmet fitted with a visor. Survey Team S2
and attached personnel were all wearing correct Individual Protection Equipment at the
time of the accident.

DETAILED ACCOUNT OF ACTIVITIES ON 23APRIL1998
43. This account is taken from written statements and from formal and informal interviews
and statements from all personnel involved. Most interviews took place through
interpreters.
44. Survey Team S2 departed [the Demining group]’s local headquarters at Ljubinje Hotel as
normal at around 0730hrs. They started work at the task site at around 0800hrs, as
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normal. A daily briefing from the team commander is normally given to the team,
covering points relating to safety and the day’s anticipated activities. This briefing is part
of daily routine activity, as per [the Demining group]’s SOPs.
45. The Team Leader was aware that the stone walls that surrounded the teams work area
could be suitable places for Anti Personnel mines to be laid.
46. Deminers were deployed to their places of work. This involved marking lanes with paint
and with tape markings, or preparing wooden pickets to be used as markers. Team
Leader states that some deminers were also employed prodding cut lines already
cleared by the dogs.
47. Dogs are normally deployed one at a time, as one dog completes a work cycle the
second dog starts work. On this day Dog Handler [Victim No.1] started work first, with his
dog. They were deployed to clear an area furthest from the Control Point. Team Leader
observed the dog and handler at work from a distance of approximately 30 metres. He
states that they were working in a normal manner.
48. Team Leader was observing the dog at work from a distance of approximately thirty
metres.

THE MINE
49. Mine involved was a PROM-1 bounding Anti Personnel fragmentation mine. The base
plate, of the mine was discovered at the bottom of the resulting crater. No evidence of
the use of a tripwire was found during the investigation on site.
50. When a dog makes a “find”, it is normal for the animal to turn to face its handler and then
sit down. Tufts and strands of dog hair were distributed around the crater for
approximately 450 millimetres. The dog’s tail was approximately three metres from the
crater. The dog’s back legs were approximately three metres from the crater, each leg in
a different direction.
51. The dog’s body was approximately six metres from the crater, at the base of a stone
wall. The Board of Inquiry considered it apparent that the dog had been thrown against
the wall by the blast from the mine and had then fallen to the base of the wall.

TASKING
52. Tasking came from RS PIU, in the normal manner.
53. UN MAC holds information about this task site and related areas. A task folder was
prepared and issued from UN MAC Information department. Team on site was in
possession of this information.

SUMMARY
54. This team was demining in an area of very difficult terrain. Dogs were the best solution to
the problem at hand. Correct drills were being employed. Supervision and Quality
Assurance measures were entirely sufficient. Evidence suggests that the dog sat on the
mine, causing the mine to detonate. Three personnel were injured by one mine.
Evacuation time was one hour and thirty-five minutes from the time of detonation to
arrival at the hospital.

CONCLUSIONS
55. The mine was very probably detonated because the dog sat on it, possibly during the act
of signalling its “find” to the handler.
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56. Evacuation time was marginally longer than would normally be anticipated in this theatre.
This was probably due to the distance between the task site and the hospital.
57. Some personnel were working too close to each other, for operations in an area where
fragmentation mines were known to have been laid.

RECOMMENDATIONS
58. The demining team involved in this accident should undergo a minimum of one day’s
retraining.
59. [The Demining group]’s senior dog handler should evaluate current training regimes for
all dogs.
60. [The Demining group]’s National Operations Manager should re-visit the hospital at
Stolac and confirm their earlier evaluation on whether this would be a viable alternative
for use by teams operating in this region.
61. The minimum safety distance between personnel required by MAC Technical Guidelines
is 25 metres. This distance should be extended to 50 metres, subject to ground and
cover, in areas where PROM-1 mines are anticipated.
Signed: EOD Coordinator, Coordination Advisor

Distribution
Programme Manager HQ MAC
World Bank
PIU Republika Srpska
[The Demining group]

Victim Report
Victim number: 278

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: dog-handler

Fit for work: DECEASED

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 1 hour 35 minutes

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet,
Short visor

Helmet
Short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Arms
severe Body
severe Legs
FATAL
COMMENT
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See medical report.

Medical report
The field medic reported briefly that "after bandaging and infusion we evacuated the injured".
Another stated (with similar brevity that "we removed his clothes and flak-jacket, gave him
infusion and continued with bandaging and immobilisation of his broken extremities". [This
implies severe arm and leg injuries.]
Victim No.1's body armour was penetrated in nine places with the lower part of it "blasted
away". [This implies severe body injuries.] He died ten minutes after arrival at hospital, one
hour and 45 minutes after the accident occurred.

Victim Report
Victim number: 279

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: yes

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 1 hour 35 minutes

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet,
Short visor

Helmet
Short visor

Summary of injuries:
COMMENT
No medical report was made available. The victim suffered "slight" fragment injuries and was
released from hospital on the day of the accident.

Victim Report
Victim number: 280

Name: Name removed
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: deminer

Fit for work: presumed

Compensation: not made available

Time to hospital: 1 hour 35 minutes

Protection issued: Frag jacket

Protection used: Frag jacket, Helmet,
Short visor

Helmet
Short visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES
severe Leg
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COMMENT
See medical report.

Medical report
The field medic reported briefly that "after bandaging and infusion we evacuated the injured".
Victim No.3 sustained fragment injuries to the back of his right knee and was expected to be
released from hospital on 28th April 1998.

Analysis
The primary cause of this accident is listed as “Inadequate training” because the dog
apparently sat on the mine, raising questions about its training and whether sitting to indicate
in this way was appropriate. The secondary cause is listed as “Unavoidable” because the
way of using the dog was approved, and the dog may have been acting exactly as trained
(and there is no general agreement on what “good” dog training is).
There was a significant “Management/control inadequacy” because it seems that the
secondary victims were more than the recommended distance away – but that the
recommended distance was inadequate.
The investigators claimed that all protection used met a 450m/s STANAG standard. The
5mm polycarbonate visors in use by the group did not (270-280m/s). The use of 5mm thick
visors was (and is) common throughout humanitarian demining operations globally.
The time taken to reach a surgical facility was too great (in a region where MEDEVAC is
relatively easy). There are also suggestions that the communications system (criticised in
previous incidents involving this demining group) was not working well on the day of the
accident.

Related papers
A second version of the MAC’s accident report was made available. This version varied only
by concealing the name of the commercial demining partnership whose deminers were
involved in the accident. The partnership was referred to as “Company Y”. The lead
demining group had been involved in several incidents and is believed to have been very
“sensitive” about bad publicity. It seems that a “friend” at the MAC sought to protect them.
A mine-dog instructor's report observing that dogs trained on surface mines tend to scratch
the ground when they find a buried mine was in the Accident file. A dog evaluation report on
the dead dog was included - indicating that the dog had "a very high forward drive which
makes him a little more difficult to handle". The handler was assessed as of a "high
standard" and the combination approved.
The dog's rabies certificate and "K-9 Field Record" was also in the file, along with it’s
handler's certificate of training.
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